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ABSTRACT  
 
In the United States, public schools are primarily financed by local tax on property. This 
property-tax-based system of finance is advantageous for people living in wealthy 
districts, as they benefit from greater educational funding resources. Residents of poorer 
districts, however, have the disadvantage of higher taxation that is needed to balance the 
deficit created by the lower value of property in these areas in order to finance local 
services. Through the use of local exclusionary planning and zoning powers, local 
governments can ensure that residents contribute a minimum amount of taxation to fund 
local services and to zone out “expensive students” who need more funds than their 
wealthier peers while their families contribute less to the local tax pool. In a society with 
a history of racial discrimination, this system has led to the creation of structural 
segregation in education that follows a pattern of residential segregation. Society’s 
adoption of equal opportunity rhetoric since the successful challenge of legal segregation 
in Brown has masked this reality and made it more difficult for depressed minorities to 
explain their condition. The injustice is produced by the interplay between historical 
subordination and a vague suspicion that equality has been achieved when formal barriers 
were removed. The potential for change was both created and limited by engaging the 
rights discourse because the emphasis on formalism and colorblindness since Brown has 
rendered the achievement of formal equality an end in itself. This makes it very difficult 
to redress the lasting material disadvantage that resulted from a discriminatory past 
because the dominant theory of equal protection that is infused with an “anti-
differentiation” understanding of the law often rules out remedial policies that use race-
based classifications.  
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I. Introduction 
Education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic 
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, 
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education. Such an opportunity where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.1
 
 
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the 
name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. […] Education, of course, is 
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. 
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.2
 
 
[T]he majority’s holding can only be seen as a retreat from our historic 
commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as unsupportable 
acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years of the 
chance to reach their full potential as citizens.3
 
 
The United States has a long history of racial segregation that formally ended in 1954 
with the Supreme Court’s promise in Brown v. Board of Education4
                                               
1Brown v. Board of Education (Brown), 347 U.S. 686, 483, 493 (1954). 
 to make education 
available to all on equal terms. Racial segregation was, however, not restricted to public 
education, and Brown’s message that separate is inherently unequal was soon accepted as 
precedent beyond the education context to prohibit state-sanctioned racial discrimination 
in the entire public domain. Apart from education, segregation was most pervasive in the 
housing sector. For many years, the official policy of the federal government was to 
promote homeownership and single-family residence in place of low-income housing 
projects. By creating incentives for middle-class families to abandon the city for the 
suburbs, the government-sponsored housing program accelerated the decline of inner city 
2San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
3Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 – 71, J. Marshall dissenting opinion. 
4Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. 
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neighborhoods and forever altered the character of housing in the United States. The 
economic exclusion of racial minorities in the United States today coupled with the 
tradition of local school finance have ultimately led to the “re-segregation” of public 
schools that began when white and wealthy families abandoned the cities for the suburbs, 
causing the poor inner-city schools to deteriorate further. 
This paper examines the legal system that allowed for economic exclusion to 
replicate previous racial exclusion and ultimately produced a problem of structural 
segregation in the American public education system. This problem is certainly more 
complex and multi-layered than government-mandated segregation of housing and public 
education. Whereas it was racism that was the driving force behind social change 
activism in the 1950s and 1960s, racism alone will not do as an explanation for the 
current plight of racial minorities that find themselves in a situation of economic 
exclusion. At the same time, the problem cannot be explained only in terms of economic 
exclusion and lack of access to public education due to disparities in income, because 
there is an evident racial dimension to the problem that cannot be ignored. The point is 
that just because the problems with public education in the post-Brown era cannot be 
solely attributed to race does not mean that race is irrelevant. It seems, however, that 
society’s adoption of the rhetoric of equal opportunity law since the successful challenge 
of segregation in Brown has masked this reality and made it more difficult for depressed 
minorities to explain their condition. 
Education jurisprudence after Brown will be analyzed in the paper in order to 
show how the potential for change was both created and limited by engaging the rights 
discourse to challenge unequal education. Since Brown, courts have adopted an approach 
to equal protection analysis that prioritizes colorblindness and race-neutrality over 
redressing the lasting effects of a history of racial subordination. Formal equality has been 
seen as an end in itself which made it more difficult to achieve a real break with the 
discriminatory past. Racial subordination lingers and takes on different forms after the 
repeal of segregation laws. The equal protection doctrine under the dominant anti-
differentiation approach and its emphasis on colorblindness fails to redress this 
subordination because it cannot recognize it. The failure of equal protection to remedy 
current inequities between whites and racial minorities is evidenced by the fact that, as 
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will be shown, litigants in education reform cases have shifted their focus from equality 
to adequacy as the goal after the repeated failure of equal protection challenges in the 
aftermath of Brown.   
In this sense, this research is essentially an inquiry into the relationship between 
law and equality and how a legal equality framework can be biased against groups with a 
history of racial subordination. Its objective is to ultimately show that Brown has failed as 
a framework for social change through the courts. It will be argued that racial minorities 
need a post-Brown strategy that is grounded in their particular reality because the 
insensitiveness of the present equal protection doctrine to the history of racial 
subordination coupled with its emphasis on colorblindness obstructs progress and stands 
in the way towards a more equal world.  
II. The History of Public Education in the United States 
A. Legal Segregation 
Free public education is firmly rooted in the history of the United States. The concept was 
introduced in American society as early as 1643 when the State of Virginia instituted a 
system of compulsory apprenticeship for certain groups including orphans, poor children 
and children born out of wedlock.5 By the middle of the nineteenth century, schooling in 
the United States had reached exceptionally high levels, among free Americans, and 
literacy was virtually universal, once again among the free population.6
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution improved the legal rights of 
blacks, in particular the freed slaves, by granting them the “equal protection of the law.” 
In spite of the Fourteenth Amendment, many states throughout the South enacted so-
By contrast, slaves 
were categorically excluded from formal school instruction until 1865 when slavery was 
abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, while free blacks attended – 
if at all – segregated schools which typically suffered from the lack of funds, trained 
teachers and equipment. 
                                               
5 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to education: Mission to the United States of America, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/60/Add.1 
(January 17, 2002) (prepared by Katarina Tomašesvski).  
6 Claudia Goldin, A Brief History of Education in the United State 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Historical Paper No. 119, 1999). 
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called “Jim Crow laws” that mandated segregation of whites and racial minorities in all 
public facilities. In 1892, one such “Jim Crow law” was challenged in court for the first 
time. In a train of the East Louisiana Railroad, a passenger, Homer Plessy, who was 
classified as “Black” according to Louisiana law refused to leave the car for whites which 
ultimately lead to his arrest. Plessy challenged the arrest in court, arguing that that the 
legal separation of blacks from whites on trains violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1896, his case was heard by the United States Supreme 
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson7
 
. By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court ruled against Plessy. In 
establishing the “separate but equal” doctrine for which it is famous, Plessy distinguished 
between social and political rights of citizenship: 
The object of the [Fourteenth] Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it 
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to 
enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the 
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.8
 
 
Plessy established a framework which was used to justify a system of complex 
laws and regulations that assigned blacks an inferior position vis-à-vis their white peers 
not only in education, but in all walks of social life from public accommodation to water 
fountains and swimming pools. The “separate but equal” doctrine established in Plessy 
dominated the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee 
for more than half a century. However, in 1954, the United States Supreme Court 
overturned this doctrine in its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education by 
ultimately striking down the system of segregated public schooling. In Brown, the 
Supreme Court consolidated five separate cases involving black children whose 
admission to public schools attended by white children was denied on the basis of their 
race. The Court held that the “segregation of white and Negro children in the public 
schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or 
requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws 
                                               
7Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
8MARVIN JONES, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF BROWN: SEATTLE, SEGREGATION AND THE REWRITING OF 
HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW 3 (2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290667 (quoting 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896)).  
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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”9Furthermore, the Warren Court declared that 
education is “the most important function of state and local governments,”10 and found 
that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”11 The Court argued that 
separating children from others solely on the basis of their race “generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone.”12
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown transcended racial segregation, as it led to 
the implementation of equal opportunity in a wide range of educational policy areas, 
including school disciplinary practices and bilingual education.
 
13Brown was also accepted 
as precedent beyond the education context to prohibit government-sanctioned racial 
discrimination in every other area of public life.14 It provided the foundation for 
challenging unconstitutional practices in other social policy areas and extending 
egalitarian principles to other historically marginalized groups, such as women, the 
elderly and the disabled.15 As desegregation and issues relating to equal educational 
opportunity became part of the courts’ agenda, integrative remedies to overcome inequity 
were ordered by the courts on a number of occasions to implement the Brown mandate. 
Congress supported the courts’ efforts to secure a meaningful educational opportunity to 
the victims of school segregation by enacting the first major education aid act (Title I of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965) and passing Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act that empowered the government to cut federal funding to any school 
district that was involved in discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin.16
B. Structural Segregation 
 
Apart from public education, segregation was most pervasive in the housing sector. 
According to Kenneth Jackson, “[n]o agency of the United States government has had a 
more pervasive and powerful impact on the American people over the past half-century 
                                               
9Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. 
10Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
11Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
12Id. 
13Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the 
Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1490 (2006-2007).  
14Id.  
15Id. at 1491. 
16Id. at 1494 – 1495.  
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than the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).”17
The FHA did not build houses, but it insured long-term mortgage loans that were 
made by private lenders to construct and sell homes against loss, “with the full weight of 
the United States Treasury behind the contract.”
 In fact, segregation in housing was 
for many years an official policy of the federal government entrusted to the FHA which 
was created as part of the National Housing Act in 1934. Perhaps it is important here to 
dedicate a few paragraphs to explaining the role of the FHA in housing segregation in 
order to provide a fuller picture of how segregation in housing in the first half of the 
twentieth century helped transform de jure segregation into a problem of structural 
segregation in the education system that follows a pattern of residential segregation.  
18 FHA-secured loans benefited the 
construction industry as well as potential homebuyers in many different ways with the 
result that the number of American families who could realistically consider the option of 
becoming homeowners increased substantially, as it oftentimes was cheaper to buy than 
to rent houses. First, as opposed to the time before the FHA began its operation when first 
mortgages were limited to one-half or two-thirds of the value of the property, a lender 
whose mortgage loan was insured by the FHA was able to grant credit that amounts to 
about 93 percent of the collateral.19 This meant that the down payments mortgagors had 
to make did not exceed ten percent. Second, the repayment period of FHA-secured loans 
was extended to twenty five to thirty years.20 Furthermore, because the risk to financial 
institutions if a loan was not repaid by the mortgagor was almost nonexistent, interest 
rates fell by two or three percentage points compared to the 1920s.21 These changes 
together with the minimum standards for home construction that were established by the 
FHA revolutionized the construction industry and fundamentally altered production and 
consumption behavior in the housing market. Jackson goes even further: “the middle-
class suburban family with the new house and long-term, fixed-rate, FHA-insured 
mortgage became a symbol, and perhaps a stereotype, of the American way of life.”22
                                               
17KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) in 
GERALD E. FRUG, RICHARD T. FORD AND DAVID J. BARRON, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (4TH ED.) 317 (2006). 
 
18 Jackson, supra note 17.  
19Id. at 317 – 318.  
20Id. at 318. 
21Id.  
22Id.  
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The obvious flipside of FHA programs was that they accelerated the decline of 
inner city neighborhoods by creating incentives for middle-class families to abandon the 
city for the suburbs. Absent an official anti-urban bias, the programs caused the financing 
stream to flow in the direction of single-family projects to the detriment of multi-family 
projects. Suburban favoritism was also the result of the “unbiased professional estimate” 
that was required by the FHA as a prerequisite to any loan guarantee.23 This mandatory 
procedure included an evaluation of the property, the borrower and the neighborhood 
with the objective of guaranteeing that the value of the insured property would always 
exceed the amount of outstanding debt during the term of the mortgage.24 Neighborhood 
appraisals, the most influential of these ratings in determining “safe locations” for 
insuring mortgages, had a lasting impact on the character of housing in the United States. 
Of the eight criteria established by the FHA for evaluating the desirability of residential 
areas for purposes of loan guarantees, “relative economic stability” and “protection from 
adverse influences” together accounted for sixty percent of the neighborhood 
evaluation.25 According to Jackson, the interpretation of both was influenced by personal 
and agency bias in favor of all-white subdivisions and thus translated into clear prejudice 
against heterogeneous environments.26 The FHA was concerned with racial disharmony 
in housing, as it feared that failure to maintain rigid white-black separation would close 
entire residential areas to financing.27 For this reason, it openly recommended regulations 
and restrictive covenants as a way of prohibiting black occupancy until the United States 
Supreme Court ruling in Shelley v. Kramer28
By re-packaging racist tradition and discriminatory market attitudes against low-
income housing as public policy, the FHA furthered the racial and economic segregation 
of suburbia and its actions radically altered the character of housing in the United States. 
However, the lasting damage done by the policies of the FHA is not confined to the 
housing market. It makes itself felt in the public services sector as well, primarily 
 that these covenants were unenforceable and 
contrary to public policy. 
                                               
23Id. 
24Id.  
25Id. at 319. 
26Id.  
27Id. at 320. 
28Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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education. Despite the shift in public discourse about racism brought about by the civil 
rights movement, racial and economic segregation still persists in America’s cities and 
schools. The economic exclusion of racial minorities in the U.S. today coupled with the 
tradition of local education finance have led to the “re-segregation” of public schools that 
began when white and wealthy families abandoned the cities for the suburbs causing the 
poor inner-city schools to deteriorate further.  
The system that allowed for economic exclusion to replicate previous racial 
exclusion can be explained as follows. In the United States, public schools are primarily 
financed by a local tax on property. Only about seven percent of a school district’s 
funding comes from the federal government.29 Schools do not get the majority of their 
revenues even from the states, as the ultimate decision about school finance is made by 
school districts.30
The interplay between racial and economic factors in the production of structural 
segregation is explained by Richard Ford’s economic model of a society which consists 
of only two groups, blacks and whites, where blacks, due to historical discrimination, 
 This property-tax-based system of finance is advantageous for people 
living in wealthy districts, as they benefit from greater educational funding resources. By 
contrast, residents of poorer districts have the disadvantage of higher taxation that is 
needed to balance the deficit created by the lower value of property in these areas in order 
to finance local services. Of course, common sense would lead poorer families to 
contemplate purchasing smaller residential units in wealthy districts to benefit from the 
lower tax burdens and the quality services offered by the locality including public 
education. This option is, however, foreclosed by the use of local exclusionary planning 
and zoning powers which is an organizing principle in American local government law. 
To prevent poor families from “infiltrating” the locality, local governments can set a 
minimum lot size for property within their boundaries to ensure that residents contribute a 
minimum amount of taxation to fund local services and to zone out “expensive students” 
who need more funds than their wealthier peers while their families contribute less to the 
local tax pool.  
                                               
29Deric Wu, Can International Human Rights Law Change the State of Minority Education in the United 
States?, 8 RUTGERS RACE AND L. REV. 139, 141 (2006).  
30Goldin, supra note 6, at 2.   
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tend to earn less than whites.31 Ford’s model assumes that this society has enacted a 
program of reform that has eliminated the legal sanction of racial discrimination, and has 
succeeded in eliminating racism altogether through a program of public education.32 This 
hypothetical society also consists of geographically defined governments with extensive 
powers to levy local taxes and use the revenues to fund local services including public 
education.33 Before the program of racial reform was enacted, this society was strictly 
segregated along racial lines, such that it consisted of entirely white and entirely black 
enclaves.34 Against this background, it could be imagined that the elimination of de jure 
discrimination and racial prejudice would eventually lead to racial desegregation. 
According to Ford, however, even in the absence of racism, white neighborhoods would 
be eager to maintain their “whiteness” for purely economic reasons as long as substantial 
income differences between whites and blacks persist.35 Whites would be reluctant to 
leave their white neighborhoods and move into poorer black neighborhoods with higher 
tax burdens and a lower quality of local services. As a result, racial segregation will be 
transformed into economic segregation.36 “Thus, even in the absence of racism, race-
neutral policy could be expected to entrench segregation and socio-economic 
stratification in a society with a history of racism. […] Spatially and racially defined 
communities perform the ‘work’ of segregation silently.”37 The potency of this dynamic 
will, of course, become more apparent if we introduce real-life complications into this 
model, such as racial fear, local zoning powers, redlining and the preference of private 
developers to build affordable housing in white jurisdictions.38
Ford describes the problem with the present-day political geography of America 
as a problem of economic exclusion with a racial profile. This problem is certainly more 
complex and nuanced than government-mandated segregation of housing and public 
education. Whereas it was racism that was the driving force behind social change actions 
in the 1950s and 1960s, racism alone will not do as an explanation for the current plight 
 
                                               
31 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1843, 1849-1850 (1993-1994). 
32Id. at 1850. 
33Id.  
34Id.  
35Id. at 1851. 
36Id.  
37Id. at 1852. 
38Id. at 1853-1856. 
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of racial minorities that find themselves in a situation of economic exclusion. At the same 
time, the problem cannot be explained only in terms of economic exclusion and lack of 
access to public education due to disparities in income, because there is an evident racial 
dimension to the problem that cannot be ignored. The point is that just because the 
problems with public education in the post-Brown era cannot be solely attributed to race 
does not mean that race is irrelevant. As Ruth Gordon points out, race is a fluctuating and 
contingent concept because its meaning is constantly re-shaped as a result of social 
struggle.39
III. The Shift From Equality to Adequacy 
It seems, however, that society’s adoption of the rhetoric of equal opportunity 
law since the successful challenge of segregation in courts has masked this reality and 
made it more difficult for depressed minorities to explain their condition. The injustice is 
not produced by an identifiable discriminator anymore, but by the interplay between 
historical subordination and a vague suspicion that equality has been achieved when 
formal barriers were removed. The following section summarizes the court decisions that 
had the greatest influence on education law and policy following Brown in an effort to 
show how the potential for change was both created and limited by engaging the rights 
discourse. The discussion in the next part is intended as a framework for the main 
argument of the paper that the emphasis on formalism and colorblindness since Brown 
has rendered the achievement of formal equality an end in itself. This makes it very 
difficult to redress the lasting material disadvantage that resulted from a history of racial 
subordination because the dominant theory of equal protection does not capture the 
complexity of structural segregation. The failure of equal opportunity rhetoric to remedy 
current inequities between whites and racial minorities is evidenced by the fact that, as 
will be shown, litigants have abandoned equality as a standard for challenging the 
substandard education received by minority children. 
A. The Retreat from Brown: Rodriguez 
Nineteen years after Brown, the ideological shift in the Supreme Court at the time of the 
Nixon appointments resulted in the Court’s first open refusal to recognize that a right to 
                                               
39Ruth Gordon, Foreword, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 
VILL. L. REV. 827, 838 – 839 (2000).  
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education is protected by the U.S. Constitution in its ruling in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez40. Rodriguez, one of the earliest school finance cases, was an 
unsuccessful class action challenge to local school finance brought by Mexican American 
parents of elementary and secondary school children in the Edgewood Independent 
School District on behalf of school children residing in Texas.41 The main contention in 
this case was that the public education funding scheme in Texas resulted in the allocation 
of lesser funds per student in poorer districts compared to wealthier ones which amounted 
to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The funding 
system challenged by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez can be explained as follows. In addition 
to the state education funds provided to all school districts, the State of Texas permitted 
localities to generate revenues for education finance through a system of property tax 
within each district. Given that some districts were property-rich while others were 
property-poor, this system inevitably resulted in significant inter-district disparities in 
available education funds.42
The Court’s decision in Rodriguez has been perceived as a retreat from Brown’s 
commitment to equal educational opportunity. The Court acknowledged that the 
overwhelming majority of school children in Edgewood belonged to minority groups in 
contrast with Alamo Heights, the wealthy district, which was predominantly white.
 
43 The 
Court, however, chose to ignore the significance of the districts’ racial make-up, and 
considered whether the Texas funding scheme discriminated on the basis of wealth in the 
provision of education. In this respect, the Court found that wealth was not a suspect 
classification arguing that there was no clearly defined disadvantaged class in Rodriguez 
that the financing system can be said to discriminate against. Thus, writing for the Court, 
Justice Powell concluded that “the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any suspect class.”44
                                               
40Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 
 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell pointed 
out that the plaintiffs did not claim a complete deprivation of education, but that they 
were receiving a relatively poor quality of education compared to that available to 
41 Wu, supra note 29, at 142.  
42 James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on U.S. Education: Only Some Children Matter, 50 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 919, 922 (2001).  
43Id.  
44Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
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children in wealthier districts.45 In the Court’s opinion, however, “where wealth is 
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely 
equal advantages.”46
The Court then proceeded to consider whether education is a fundamental right 
under the Constitution. After recalling Brown’s emphasis on the importance of education, 
Justice Powell noted that “the importance of a service performed by the State,” however, 
“does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of 
examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”
 
47 Because courts are not in position to 
“create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of 
the laws,” the key to determining whether education is a fundamental right is to assess 
whether a right to education is established either explicitly or implicitly in the 
Constitution.48 Clearly, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly recognize that education 
is a fundamental right. Alternatively, the appellees in Rodriguez argued that there is a 
nexus between education, on the one hand, and free speech and the right to vote on the 
other, and that without proper education citizens cannot fully participate in the political 
process.49 The Court rejected the nexus theory advanced by the appellees and argued that 
“[e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a 
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have 
no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an 
education that falls short.”50
Rodriguez signaled a turning point in American jurisprudence on education 
towards an increasingly limited role of the judiciary in recognizing a right to education 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on the finding 
that wealth is not a suspect class and that education does not qualify as a fundamental 
right, the Rodriguez Court rejected the application of strict scrutiny and following 
precedent decided to apply the rational basis test to the claim at hand. In doing so, the 
Court held that the state’s reliance on property tax to finance education was rationally 
 
                                               
45Id. 
46Id. 
47Id.  
48Id.  
49 Brooke Wilkins, Should Public Education be a Federal Fundamental Right?, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 
261, 271 (2005).  
50Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36- 37. 
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related to the legitimate interest of the state to preserve local control of public schools.51 
As opposed to strict scrutiny, which imposes a substantial burden on the executive to 
justify the regulation on the basis of a compelling government interest, the rational basis 
review is a lenient standard that only requires a legitimate interest and the existence of a 
rational relation between the means and the end. Thus, as one commentator argues, 
“[g]enerally, if a regulation of a right is subject to rational basis scrutiny, in all likelihood 
the regulation will survive.”52
B. From Equality to Adequacy: The State Courts’ Response 
 In the Rodriguez case, unequal public funding schemes 
based on property tax survived in the name of “local control,” the very mechanism that 
allowed segregation to flourish in the pre-Brown era and that continues to do so until the 
present day.  
In fact, the holding of the Court in Rodriguez foreclosed any opportunity for litigants to 
challenge discriminatory education finance schemes in the federal court system. Hence, in 
the decades following Rodriguez education reform litigation shifted to state courts. As a 
direct response to Rodriguez, individual states introduced explicit constitutional 
protections of the right to education in an attempt to remedy the problems facing the 
public education system in the United States.53 In essence, litigants challenged local 
funding systems on the basis of either the equal protection clause or the education clause 
in state constitutions.54 Plaintiffs bringing cases under equal protection clauses were, 
however, confronted with challenges similar to those in federal equal protection cases.55 
While finance inequality claims based on racial discrimination were usually found by the 
courts to be unconstitutional, the courts were reluctant to find constitutional violations if 
the government was able to offer a rational justification for the regulation in question.56 
The justification generally offered by the government was again local control.57
                                               
51 Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475, 
479 (1998).  
 Claims 
52 Wilkins, supra note 49, at 266.  
53Angela Avis Holland, Resolving the Dissonance of Rodriguez and the Right to Education: International 
Human Rights Instruments as a Source of Repose for the United States, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 229, 
242 (2008).  
54 Wu, supra note 29, at 142.  
55Id.  
56Id.  
57Id.  
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brought under the education clause in state constitutions were, however, more successful. 
In such cases, plaintiffs did not challenge the equality of the local school finance system 
in the conventional sense, but focused instead on the language of the education clause 
itself to assess whether there is sufficient funding for schools in poor urban areas to 
achieve state educational standards.58
Thus, it can be said that the litigation strategy in state finance distribution cases 
has shifted from challenging the equality of the distribution formula to questioning the 
adequacy of the formula in an effort to demonstrate that an education finance system 
based on property tax fails to meet the minimum level of education as required by the 
education clause in the state’s constitution. Litigants have also argued that the inadequacy 
of the distribution system is evidenced by sub-standard student outcomes in poor urban 
schools.
 
59 The link between inadequate school facilities and low student achievement was 
made by plaintiffs in one of the recent adequacy lawsuits on the state level. In Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York,60
If you ask the children to attend school in conditions where plaster is crumbling, 
the roof is leaking and classes are being held in unlikely places because of 
overcrowded conditions, that says something to the child about how you diminish 
the value of the activity and of the child’s participation in it and perhaps of the 
child himself. If, on the other hand, you send a child to a school in well-appointed 
or [adequate facilities] that sends the opposite message. That says this counts. You 
count. Do well.
the plaintiffs maintained that: 
61
 
 
In this case, the New York Supreme Court held that the local education finance scheme 
violated the constitution on the basis that the funding of New York City schools was 
inadequate. The case originated in a successful claim brought in 1995 by the Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity asserting that students in New York City schools were being denied a 
“sound basic education” as mandated by the state constitution. The New York Supreme 
Court decision was overturned by the appellate court on the basis that the state’s 
obligation was limited to certain grade level proficiencies.62
                                               
58R. Craig Wood and Bruce D. Baker, An Examination and Analysis of the Equity and Adequacy Concepts 
of Constitutional Challenges to State Education Distribution Formulas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
125, 134 (2004).  
 The litigation ended in 2006 
59Id.  
60 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2001).  
61Id.  
62 Wood and Baker, supra note 58, at 143.  
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when the highest court in the State of New York, the State Court of Appeals, issued its 
ruling in which it upheld the judgment of the trial court and directed the state to determine 
the cost of a “sound basic education” in New York City schools.63
An overview of state court decisions in cases where the constitutionality of 
education funding schemes relying on local property taxes was being challenged by 
litigants on the basis of inequality or inadequacy is beyond the scope and purpose of this 
paper. A few remarks on the outcome of these cases and its implications for future 
education reform litigation are, however, in order here. First, convincing the courts to 
recognize that wealth is a suspect class is an extraordinarily difficult task.
 
64 Courts 
recognized early on that establishing wealth as a suspect class would have a spillover 
effect on all other governmental services that could be subject to the same claim with 
great implications for society at large.65 Furthermore, the recognition of education as a 
fundamental constitutional right by state courts is a remote possibility due to the existence 
of contravening federal precedent.66
C. Adequacy and Equality Arguments 
 It is thus plausible to conclude that the success of 
challenges to local education finance systems largely depends on the 
adequacy/soundness/minimum level language of the education clauses in state 
constitutions. The reason for this is that courts have generally moved away from striking 
down unequal education finance mechanisms where plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that 
inequality produces inadequate education systems that are unable to train students to 
reach the state-set standards of education. 
There are many possible explanations for the shift from equality to adequacy arguments 
in school finance litigation. While the shift in focus from equality to adequacy is in some 
cases arguably a matter of strategy, it seems to be motivated by a feeling of necessity in 
other cases where litigants return to court after having lost an equality argument.67
                                               
63Id.  
The 
shift to adequacy has been generally embraced by the academic community. Professor 
64Id. at 144. 
65Id.  
66Id.  
67 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249, 268-269 (1999-2000).  
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Peter Enrich, for example, has called for “leaving equality behind”68 because adequacy 
may simply prove to be more attainable than equality in school finance reform largely due 
to the inherent difficulties in the concept of equity. Arguably, litigants have shifted their 
attention from equality to adequacy because equality has proven to be a disappointing 
tool in the struggle over education reform.69
According to Enrich, “[t]he connection between the two is now mediated, not 
only by political decisions about how heavily to tax, but also by administrative judgments 
(and skill) in using the resources that are made available.”
 Enrich notes that equality arguments suffer 
from several weaknesses. The most important, perhaps, is the difficult task of giving the 
concept of equality specific content in the context of education because of the difficulty in 
establishing the link between cause and effect. The problem, in other words, is 
establishing that inequalities in the education received by white and minority children 
result from the disparities in the funding available to schools as a result of local wealth.  
70 Equal educational services 
will not guarantee equal schooling because students show up at school with different 
needs that have to be addressed in order to realize the ideal of equal educational 
opportunity. In fact, many studies growing out of the 1966 Coleman Report71 suggested 
that, by and large, academic achievement levels do not correspond to spending levels and 
the educational resources available at schools.72 Enrich concludes that equality has 
proven too ambitious a standard in the context of education reform.73 The growing 
disenchantment with the goal of equality in education, the argument goes, could only 
mean that the time has come for education reformers to leave equality behind and pursue 
the more modest, but more attainable, goals of adequacy.74
Enrich is correct in saying that unequal education cannot be solely attributable to 
disparities in the funding available to schools. The system of locally funded education is 
but one item on the list of factors that contribute to the problem of unequal schooling like 
de facto segregation in housing, zoning, economic exclusion and a long history of racial 
 
                                               
68 Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 
(1995).  
69Id. at 143. 
70Id. at 149. 
71JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY (1966).  
72 Enrich, supra note 68, at 150.  
73Id. at 154. 
74Id. at 182. 
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subordination. It is only natural that equal protection challenges do not yield the desired 
results because the factors that combine to produce unequal education are diluted by the 
emphasis on race-neutrality that is at the core of a formal understanding of equality. What 
Enrich fails to note is that the connection between unequal funding and substandard 
education is mediated by all of these factors and not only by taxing policies and 
administrative decisions about how to use the available resources. Enrich is right that 
equality has disappointed, but he errs in suggesting that adequacy should be pursued 
instead of equality as the goal for education reform because adequacy and equality are 
conceptually distinct and one cannot simply be substituted for the other. The fundamental 
difference between equality and adequacy is the comparative nature of equality. In other 
words, the equality approach to educational opportunity is concerned with relative 
deprivation, while the adequacy framework aims at the elimination of absolute 
deprivation. In practical terms, this means that the adequacy framework makes targeting 
additional resources to disadvantaged students above a certain threshold seem less 
justifiable.  
William Koski and Rob Reich argue that the inequalities that exist above a 
threshold level of adequacy are objectionable because education is in large part a 
“positional good.” This simply means that “one’s position or relative standing in the 
distribution of education, rather than one’s absolute attainment of education, matters a 
great deal.”75 Education is a positional good because it is a decisive factor in the 
competition for admission to higher education and for well-paying positions in the job 
market.76 The admissions benefit reinforces the benefit of obtaining a high-paying job, 
and both together lead to greater job satisfaction, more civic engagement and better 
access to healthcare services on the long-run.77Koski and Reich argue that insofar as 
education is a positional good, adequacy threatens to compound the positional advantage 
of the wealthy.78 Furthermore, adequacy fails to address the needs of the worse-off 
because only equality can account for unfair positional advantages in education.79
                                               
75 William S. Koski and Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law 
and Policy and Why it Matters, 56 EMROY L. J. 545, 549 (2006).  
 For 
76Id. at 597. 
77Id. at 597 – 598.  
78Id. at 604. 
79Id. at 605. 
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these reasons, “adequacy is an inadequate substitute for equality in education policy.”80 
Or as Justice Marshall put it in the context of Rodriguez, it is “of little benefit to an 
individual from a property-poor district to have ‘enough’ education if those around him 
have more than ‘enough’.”81
It thus seems hardly possible to trade equality for adequacy if education reform is 
to have any meaning at all. All the same, it would be undoubtedly a wrong strategic move 
to argue that the substandard education received by children in poor and predominantly 
minority children violates the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee. It is 
generally not possible to attribute the transition from equality to adequacy in education 
reform jurisprudence to changes in the nature of the public education problem itself. The 
main features of the problem, with the exception of government sanctioned segregation, 
remain largely unaltered. What changed are rather the strategies and counter-strategies 
deployed by courts and litigants in trying to deal with the problem. Whereas the aim of 
desegregation cases was to achieve equality through integration, school finance cases 
focused on the disparities in the availability of resources for education.
 
82 Both sets of 
cases thus shared the initial goal of tying the fate of poor and minority students with that 
of their white and wealthy peers.83
Legal scholarship on education policy in the United States mostly oscillates 
between support for equal educational opportunity, adequacy arguments and efforts to 
combine both. But the fact remains that in education, adequacy is the new equality. Ever 
since Rodriguez, educational reform litigation has moved to state courts that provided an 
alternative forum for securing equal educational opportunity and adequacy. While 
educational equality litigation has continued on the state level, however, cases 
challenging the inadequacy of education have been more successful for education reform 
But as in desegregation cases, litigants in school 
finance cases shifted their attention to securing sufficient funds for a basic (read: 
adequate) level of education in the most economically and/or racially isolated school 
districts after the Supreme Court declared in Rodriguez that funding inequalities between 
school districts does not violate the U.S. Constitution.  
                                               
80Id. at 613. 
81Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 114. 
82 Ryan, supra note 67, at 259.  
83Id.  
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movements. But why has equality failed poor and minority schoolchildren, and why has it 
disappointed their advocates? Was it not the case for equality that gave us Brown after 
all?  
The problem, it seems, lies not in the choice of equal protection as a tool for 
challenging inequities in the education system because education reform is not about 
adequacy at all. As Koski and Reich correctly argue, education is a positional good which 
makes inequalities above a certain threshold objectionable. The trouble, as will be shown 
in the following part, is with the formalistic approach to equality that dominates the 
jurisprudence on education. It will be argued that while society’s adoption of equal 
opportunity rhetoric does not in and of itself entail a commitment to racial inequality, the 
belief in colorblindness created the unfounded conviction that a break with the past has 
been achieved with regards to segregation. As a result of the long history of racial 
subordination in the United States, minorities, primarily blacks, suffer from lasting 
material disadvantages. Yet, affirmative action programs that aim at remedying the 
effects of past discrimination are almost always invalidated by courts under the pretext 
that they send out a message of inferiority about minorities because race-neutrality is the 
rule. The reason for these paradoxical results, as will be discussed next, is that dominant 
theories about equal protection are based on an “anti-differentiation” principle that 
perpetuates racial hierarchy by prioritizing race-neutrality over the need to redress a 
history of subordination. Ultimately, the aim is to show that in education the process of 
social change through the courts has failed because while anti-subordination may be the 
aspiration, anti-differentiation is the reality that stands in the way towards a more equal 
future.  
IV. The Equal Rights Discourse 
Blacks made a serious ideological challenge to the dominant system at the time when they 
demanded their “rights”: rights taken for granted by Americans, but routinely denied to 
blacks. Marvin Jones inquires into the meaning of segregation and concludes that 
segregation can be best described as a system of racial caste.84
                                               
84 Jones, supra note 8, at 18.  
 The harm of segregation, 
the argument goes, is social stigma which is significant because it sends a message of 
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inferiority about blacks: “[s]egregation was rooted in slavery and slavery could only be 
rationalized […] by a story of black inferiority. Black inferiority in turn is simply the flip 
side of white supremacy. The message of segregation was a message of white supremacy, 
i.e. that blacks were an inferior order of human life.”85
 Yet while the adoption of equal opportunity rhetoric created the potential for 
change, it also defined its limits. As demonstrated previously, the problem of public 
education in the United States has evolved into a problem of structural segregation since 
Brown was decided. Legalized discrimination in education on ethnic and racial grounds 
was successfully challenged in the 1950s, but economic exclusion was never addressed 
and federal actors have been increasingly reluctant to recognize the nexus between race 
and poverty in devising education reform policies. The historical legacy of racism and 
segregation that took its most pervasive form in the housing and education sectors 
coupled with the tradition of local school finance produced a system of social institutions 
that breeds durable, cumulative, racial inequalities. The disadvantageous situation that 
poor and predominantly minority schoolchildren find themselves in as a result today can 
only be corrected if fundamental institutional changes were introduced. Unfortunately, the 
recognition of the need for deeper institutional changes by civil rights advocates came at a 
time when the public has begun to be convinced that the formal changes have 
successfully ended the subordination of blacks.
 The use of the rights rhetoric can 
thus be seen as a radical act and real, tangible changes have accompanied its advent. The 
government responded to the demands of the civil rights movement by removing most 
formal barriers that represented the subordination of blacks in society. These changes 
would not have materialized had the civil rights movement not engaged the rights 
discourse because the demands for change would not have reflected the dominant 
institutional logic at the time.  
86
                                               
85Id. at 24. 
The same conviction has found its way 
into the equal protection doctrine. With its emphasis on colorblindness and race-
neutrality, equal opportunity law as developed by the courts in the aftermath of Brown 
has been unable to redress racial subordination because it cannot recognize it.  
86Kimberli Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1348(1987-1988).  
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A. America’s Break with the Past 
A good starting point for understanding why the problem of segregation in education has 
persisted despite efforts to reverse the course of discrimination against blacks is to ask: 
when can it be said that segregation has ended? The question put differently would be: 
what constitutes a break with the past in regard to issues of racial discrimination in 
America considering the fact that schools have virtually re-segregated since Brown? As a 
response to these queries, Marvin Jones suggests that while Brown formally resolved the 
segregation dilemma, it failed to define segregation. Specifically, the Court in Brown was 
caught between two possible approaches to defining segregation: “was it an evil of 
discrete decisions or an evil of its stigmatizing effects?”87
The doctrinal debate in Parents Involved v. Seattle
 By failing to address these 
questions, the Court left Brown unclear and the dilemma of segregation unresolved which 
led to the reproduction and resurfacing of this dilemma in the cases that followed because 
the courts never got beyond the text of Brown.  
88 is a good example of the 
duality of equality that developed in the aftermath of Brown due to the latter’s failure to 
resolve the question of segregation. In this case, the Supreme Court consolidated two 
cases that raised the same issue, one from Seattle, Washington and one from Jefferson 
County, Kentucky.89
                                               
87 Jones, supra note 8, at 4 – 5.  
 The question before the Court in Seattle was whether a school 
district, that has never operated legally segregated schools, could classify schoolchildren 
on the basis of race and then use this classification to allocate slots in high schools as a 
measure to achieve racial balance in the schools. In the Seattle case, the school board 
responded to a lawsuit brought by the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) in 1969 claiming that the board established and maintained a 
system of segregated public schools by a plan that included race-based transfers and 
mandatory busing. In 1977, the NAACP filed another legal complaint against the school 
board with the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) in the aftermath of which a settlement agreement was signed between the 
school board and the OCR to implement what came to be known as the “Seattle Plan.” 
The Plan which began with mandatory busing in 1978 evolved by 1999 into an “open 
88 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Seattle), 551 U. S. (2007). 
89 Jones, supra note 8, at 5.  
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choice” plan in which students rank their preferred schools. The district retained a racial 
“tiebreaker” for oversubscribed schools to achieve a desired racial balance in each school 
when a student’s first choice cannot be accommodated. The petitioner in Seattle, Parents 
Involved in Community Schools, challenged the most recent plan, specifically the use of 
racial tiebreakers, under the State and Federal Constitutions. The Washington Supreme 
Court, the Federal District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected 
the challenge and ruled in favor of the Seattle School District.  
 In Jefferson County, the school had been under a court-ordered desegregation 
scheme beginning in 1975. The complex desegregation plan ordered by the District Court 
required redrawing school attendance zones, closing a number of schools and busing 
groups of students to schools outside their neighborhood. A decade later the school board 
revised its desegregation plan due to changing demographics in the community. It created 
new racial percentages, redrew district boundaries, added magnet programs at a few 
schools and adjusted the system for grouping and busing students. By 1991, the school 
board revisited the desegregation plan once more and came to the conclusion that 
assigning elementary school students to more than one school during their elementary 
years was unsound educational policy. To avoid the drawbacks of mandatory busing, the 
school board adopted a new plan emphasizing school choice. The choice plan that was 
modified again in 1996 expanded the transfer opportunities available to elementary and 
middle school students. Under this plan, students were assigned to the school they listed 
as their first choice, unless the school was oversubscribed or unless the assignment would 
tip the racial balance of the school. In 2000, the District Court dismantled the 1975 
desegregation plan after reviewing the present plan. In 2003, the petitioner, Crystal 
Meredith, brought a lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of the 1996 plan, but the 
challenge was rejected by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit which held the plan constitutional.  
 As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court in Seattle consolidated the two cases 
just discussed, as both involve the same issue: can a school district classify on the basis of 
race and take race-based measures to achieve racial balance in schools without violating 
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee? To answer this question, the 
Court in Seattle examined the measures taken under strict scrutiny to determine whether 
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they were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. In applying the 
test, the majority held that while remedying past discrimination is a compelling 
government interest justifying the use of race-based classifications, such an interest 
cannot be said to exist here because the schools involved were never legally segregated 
nor subject to court-ordered desegregation.90 The Court argued that race is an inherently 
suspect classification and rejected race-based classifications because they reinforce 
notions of racial inferiority and eventually lead to racial hostility.91 To support its view 
that the harm of segregation is the act of dividing people by race itself, the majority 
quotes Brown as saying that segregation deprived black schoolchildren of equal 
educational opportunity because the classification and separation themselves denoted 
inferiority, regardless of whether other factors were equal.92 In other words, it was not the 
inequality of the school facilities but the fact of legally separating children on account of 
their race that the Brown court held unconstitutional.93
 It is curious how Judge Roberts, speaking for the majority, talks about “American 
children” or “schoolchildren” as the group addressed and affected by the judgment in 
Brown. In astonishing denial of the unique historic experience of blacks with segregation 
and racial domination, Judge Roberts writes: “[b]efore Brown, schoolchildren were told 
where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.”
 Essentially then, Brown was about 
the differential treatment accorded to children on the basis of their race or color and its 
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.  
94 To this, 
Judge Stevens replies in his dissenting opinion: “[t]he Chief Justice fails to note that it 
was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell 
stories of white children struggling to attend black schools.”95
                                               
90Seattle, 551 U.S.at 12.The Court noted that the desegregation plan to which the Jefferson County schools 
were subject was dissolved.  
 By adding this qualifier, 
namely that Brown was about black schoolchildren and not individual schoolchildren, to 
the discussion of race-based classifications and their compatibility with equal protection, 
the dissent in Seattle views differential treatment from a different standpoint. In contrast 
91Id.  
92Id.  
93Id. 
94Id.  
95 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 551 U. S. 701 (2007), J. Stevens 
dissenting opinion.   
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to the majority who condemns any classification by race as inherently suspect, the dissent 
argues that any evaluation of differential treatment based on race should focus instead on 
whether such treatment imposes a burden on one of the races. The focus, in other words, 
should be on exclusion and not separation, on the stigmatizing effects of different 
treatment and not the decision to treat differently.  
 The doctrinal debate between the two sides of the Court thus becomes a 
discussion about competing conceptions of equality. In this debate, the majority and 
dissent talk past each other. The majority sees discrimination against blacks in 
particularistic terms and traces it back to discrete acts or decisions that violate the 
principle of colorblindness. Articulating the problem of segregation this way defines the 
solution narrowly. According to the majority, the remedy is to extend formal equality to 
all Americans and adopt strictly colorblind policies in regulating education. The solution, 
in other words, is for society to embrace the equal opportunity ideal, an objective which 
has been achieved by Brown. A completely different account of segregation is given by 
the dissent in Seattle. For the dissent, the lasting effect of different treatment is what gives 
any definition of discrimination its content. Judge Stevens’ observation that Brown is 
about black schoolchildren and not individual children is meant to bring into the 
discussion about remedial measures of segregation the history of the hierarchical 
relationship between blacks and whites. It is meant to highlight the fact that segregation is 
a social etiquette based on exclusion that has long historical roots and that cannot possibly 
be traced to a set of discrete decisions. Shunning the universalism of the Court, the 
dissent contextualizes Brown and the experience of blacks as a powerless minority 
suffering from the stigma of a system of segregation imposed by the dominant racial 
group. The remedy for this social injury cannot be colorblindness because blacks as a 
group have been historically subjected to different treatment and because the effects of 
this treatment continued into the present.  
 Because constitutional interpretation is historical interpretation96
                                               
96 Jones, supra note 8, at 9.  
 and because the 
law never dictates which meaning attaches to it, the Court in Seattle is not divided by 
different legal interpretations, but rather by two different visions of society. What the 
majority and the dissent disagree about is what constitutes America’s “break” with the 
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past when it comes to segregation. For the majority, segregation ended when formal 
equality was extended to all Americans regardless of color. Creating a break with the past 
seems to be the logic behind the majority’s claim that discrimination cannot account for 
current inequities between whites and blacks because the situation of the ‘actual’ victims 
of discrimination has been remedied when formal inequality was repealed. The position 
of the dissent, on the other hand, is that colorblindness does not make sense at all in a 
society where the effects of past discrimination against an identifiable group of people 
have continued into the present. What the dissent in Seattle is trying to argue, in other 
words, is that society’s adoption of equality rhetoric does not mean the end of racial 
inequality and that, far from being the break with the past, the significance of Brown is 
that it holds a promise yet to be fulfilled.  
B. The Antinomies of Equal Protection 
In the aftermath of Brown, courts have focused on the strong proclamation of the Brown 
Court that “separate is inherently unequal” and overlooked the fact that the main concern 
of the Court was how to redress the subordination of racial minorities. Ever since Plessy, 
the formal denial of equality to blacks has been a powerful tool in perpetuating the racial 
hierarchy and the exclusion of blacks from the vision of America as a community of 
equals. Demanding an end to different treatment and the removal of formal barriers was 
useful in the early race discrimination cases to challenge the subordination of blacks that 
was primarily manifest in segregation and other discriminatory practices that excluded 
blacks. One has to think of the “Whites Only” signs spread throughout American cities 
alone to recognize that much of what characterized discrimination against blacks under 
segregation was symbolic.97
                                               
97See Crenshaw, supra note 86, at 1377 – 1378. Crenshaw distinguishes between what she calls symbolic 
and material subordination. Symbolic subordination, according to Crenshaw, is the denial of formal 
political and social equality to blacks. Material subordination, on the other hand, refers to the perverse 
economic consequences of the discrimination and exclusion experienced by blacks. While these two aspects 
of oppression can be distinguished from one another, Crenshaw argues that both are rarely thought of 
separately. Specifically, she argues that “separate facilities were usually inferior facilities, and limited job 
categorization virtually always brought lower pay and harder work.” 
 Removal of the symbolic manifestations of subordination 
that accompanied formal reforms was a significant gain to all blacks, as it renegotiated 
their position in the American political vision. Still, some benefited from these reforms 
more than others. As Kimberli Crenshaw has pointed out, “[t]he eradication of formal 
26 
 
barriers meant more to those whose oppression was primarily symbolic than to those who 
suffered lasting material disadvantage.”98 The disappearance of “White Only” signs and 
other visual indicators of the subordination of blacks reflected society’s acceptance of 
equal opportunity rhetoric, but it did not signalize the end of racial inequality. In fact, no 
talk of a “break with the past” would make sense until the racial nature of class ideology 
is revealed and something is done about the structural problems that account for current 
inequities between whites and blacks.99
 Dominant theories of equal protection, however, see to it that achieving a break 
with the discriminatory past remains an aspiration at best. As the discussion of Seattle 
demonstrates, there are two conflicting principles embedded in the notion of equality: 
anti-differentiation and anti-subordination
 
100. From an anti-differentiation perspective, it 
is inappropriate to subject similarly situated individuals to different treatment on account 
of their race or color. For proponents of anti-differentiation, colorblindness is the rule in 
developing and analyzing legislative and institutional policies.101 Under the anti-
subordination perspective, by contrast, it is inappropriate for members of a racial group to 
be relegated to a subordinate status in society due to their lack of power vis-à-vis the 
dominant racial group.102 The crucial point here is that race-based reform measures that 
take the form of affirmative action are invalid under the anti-differentiation approach 
because they perpetuate racial stereotypes. Thus, the majority in Seattle argues that a 
school district’s decision to divide children by race is unlawful “because such 
classifications promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial 
hostility,”103 even if the function of these classifications is to achieve integration in de 
facto segregated schools. An anti-subordination analysis of the reform policies adopted by 
the defendant school districts in Seattle would produce very different results because 
under the anti-subordination doctrine facially differentiating – as well as facially neutral – 
policies are invalid only if they perpetuate racial hierarchy.104
                                               
98Id. at 1378. 
 
99Id. at 1384. 
100See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1003 (1986). 
101Id. at 1006. 
102Id. at 1007. 
103Seattle, 551 U.S. at 38 – 39. 
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 In an insightful article that compares equal protection analysis in race and gender 
cases, Ruth Colker criticizes the dominant anti-differentiation approach to equality and 
argues that equal protection cases should be analyzed from an anti-subordination 
perspective because it is consistent with the history of the equal protection clause and 
because it reflects an aspiration that will help society move towards equality. The main 
premise of her argument is that society has never set out to ban all distinctions. For 
example, distinctions based on intelligence or ability are not regarded as invidious, so 
Colker. Thus, distinctions are only prohibited when there is a good reason to believe that 
they are offensive or irrational, and it is group-based experiences that give content to this 
reasoning.105 The anti-subordination principle gives voice to a depressed minority’s own 
vision of equality and its views about why certain distinctions are invidious because it 
recognizes and draws on the particular historical experience of these groups. Anti-
differentiation, on the other hand, does a disservice to the history of subordination and to 
the understanding of the law as a remedy to this history.106
 In the early equal protection cases, the principle of anti-differentiation has, no 
doubt, been a powerful statement against segregation and other exclusionary practices 
because different treatment played a central role in perpetuating subordination.
 
107 But 
while the condition of black Americans has significantly changed ever since, no 
development in the case law reflecting these changes followed. Courts apply the strict 
scrutiny test in cases where issues of race are involved in order to ensure that no law or 
policy harboring an invidious purpose passes constitutional muster. The irony is, 
however, that taking race seriously has come with a very high price for the black 
American community on the long run. The almost complete lack of tolerance towards 
race-specific policies under strict scrutiny has led to the awkward result that virtually no 
affirmative action programs pass muster because the anti-differentiation principle that 
presently informs the courts’ interpretation of the equal protection doctrine assumes that 
differentiation can only contribute to subordination and can never redress it.108
                                               
105Id. at 1013. 
  As Ruth 
Colker points out, rejecting the elimination of subordination as justification for 
106Id. at 1012. 
107Id. at 1013 – 1014.  
108Id. at 1033. 
28 
 
differentiating on the basis of race has “needlessly curtailed the means available to 
overcome a history of racial subordination.”109 She suggests therefore that courts analyze 
equal protection cases from an anti-subordination – not an anti-differentiation – 
perspective and to invalidate differentiating policies only if they perpetuate racial 
subordination.110 Courts must also ask whether facially neutral policies have a disparate 
impact on racial minorities and invalidate such policies if they contribute to subordination 
in order to prevent rule-makers from hiding an invidious purpose behind facial 
neutrality.111 This approach, the argument goes, is more faithful to the history of black 
subordination and entails a commitment to end racial inequality because it allows the 
strict scrutiny level in race cases to be preserved while recognizing that the only 
justification for facially differentiating policies is to overcome subordination.112
V. Conclusion 
 
Anti-subordination may be the aspiration, yet anti-differentiation is the reality. “Whites 
Only” signs have been taken down: society embraced racial equality and courts 
denounced segregation. Success! But on who’s terms? It was subordination that prompted 
the Supreme Court in Brown to respond with the strict ruling that separate is unequal, but 
the anti-differentiation principle that has been read into Brown’s equal protection analysis 
obscures the historical experience of minorities. The strict level of scrutiny in race cases 
has ruled out much needed remedial policies to overcome a history of racial 
subordination. As the most rigorous form of judicial review, strict scrutiny is supposed to 
afford racial equality the greatest protection available under the constitution. Oddly, 
beyond the invalidation of different treatment laws that perpetuated subordination under 
segregation, strict scrutiny reverses the course of equality because present equality 
protection analysis is infused with an anti-differentiation understanding of the law that 
concerns itself neither with lasting disadvantage nor with the means to redress it.  
 The rulings in Seattle and other similar cases that condemned race-based 
classifications in affirmative action programs as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
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demonstrate that equal protection analysis has evolved into a Frankenstein creature of 
sorts that is blocking the way towards equality. Well-meaning academics like Ruth 
Colker suggest that adopting an anti-subordination perspective on equality will help the 
American society to move forward on racial equality. They may be right. But, once again, 
anti-differentiation, formality and colorblindness are the rules of the game. As a civil 
rights visionary has observed, “a ‘color-blind’ society built upon the subordination of 
persons of one color [is] a society which cannot correct that subordination because it 
[can] never recognize it.”113 The tendency now is to regard inequities between blacks and 
whites as a fair measure of merit. As mentioned before, creating a break with the history 
of subordination provides the basis for the claim that current inequities cannot be the 
fruits of a discriminatory past because society no longer discriminates against blacks. The 
stigma of inferiority that resulted from the unique historical experience of blacks and the 
fact that blacks are worse off than whites reinforces the popular belief that the market is 
fair and impartial.114 After all, non-differentiation is the rule and the market rewards the 
superior.115
 In retrospect, it is not difficult to see how Brown has failed as a framework for 
social change through the courts. This is not surprising because laws and courts play a 
major role in institutionalizing socio-economic power arrangements. Channeling complex 
issues to the legal arena silences the fundamental questions behind these issues and 
results in discussions that are apparently technical, neutral and devoid of politics. Race-
based classifications that are used to redress historical subordination are subjected to 
“strict scrutiny” and almost never upheld as “necessary means” to achieving the 
“compelling government interest” of remedying the effects of past discrimination. Never 
mind that these measures are “necessary” for improving the future of racial minorities; 
the formula works. As some commentators have observed, Brown was not the change but 
merely a catalyst for the change that followed; it was “a spark to a revolution culminating 
 But all of these arguments are simply rationalizations for the failure to redress 
the lasting effects of subordination.  
                                               
113 Crenshaw, supra note 86, at 1346 – 1347 (quoting Alfred Blumrosen, Twenty Years of Title VII Law: 
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in civil rights acts and erstwhile affirmative action programs.”116
                                               
116 Jones, supra note 8, at 34.  
Brown’s was not a 
legacy of education made available to all on equal terms. This was a promise that remains 
unfulfilled. What racial minorities and their advocates need is a post-Brown strategy 
grounded in the reality of economic exclusion and perpetual, cumulative inequality above 
all the formalism and neutrality of the courts. Whatever this post-Brown strategy, it must 
not look at the legal arena as the only venue for change and rights discourse as the sole 
emancipatory possibility. If racial minorities in America are to succeed, they must 
succeed on their own terms and not the terms of a (color)blind legal community that is 
delusional about its own history. 
